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Abstract
This paper studies whether a pension reform, namely a switch from a pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) to a more-funded scheme should be announced. We show
that such an announcement increases savings, leading to a decline in interest
rates. Smaller returns to savings lead to higher losses for the first transitional
generation, which suffers from the reform the most. On the other hand, higher
savings by the first transitional generation lead to faster capital accumulation,
which benefits younger generations. We argue that if a government cares about
the agents with the most to lose, it may more beneficial not to announce such
a reform.
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1 Introduction
Many countries have recently reformed their pension schemes, or are planning to
do so soon, one of the most popular changes being a switch from a pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) to a more funded scheme. It is well known that in a dynamically effi-
cient economy, such a reform reduces the welfare of the elderly living at the time
of the reform and improves the welfare of the young (Breyer 1989). In order to
mitigate the losses to the older generation, governments may wish to announce
the reform as early as possible, in order to let transitional generations reallocate
consumptions in time according to their intertemporal preferences. However,
we show that the optimal policy could be the contrary. Indeed, lower expected
pensions in the future increase savings, leading not only to less consumption
when young, but also reducing interest rates, which affect consumptions in the
future. As a result, agents’ response to the announcement is harmful to them-
selves. However, younger generations are better off if the reform is announced
in advance as they will enjoy a greater amount of capital.
The work most relevant to our paper is that of Bu¨tler (1999). She showed
that an anticipated decline in pension benefits substantially reduces consump-
tion and negatively affects welfare prior to the reform’s implementation. We
extend this finding by comparing the agents’ lifetime benefits and losses when
a pension reform is announced versus unannounced.
Santoro (2006) studied the effects of the early announcement of a rise in
pension age and minimal working period needed to qualify for public pensions
in Italy. She found that many eligible workers chose to retire in the period
between the announcement and the implementation of this reform. Our paper
differs from Santoro in the type of pension reform considered (reduced public
pensions rather than increased pension age).
Usually, a switch from a PAYG to a more-funded pension scheme is associ-
ated with a reduction in PAYG contributions. Mertens and Ravn (2012) found
that pre-announced tax cuts reduce output, investments and hours worked,
prior to their implementation, as agents reallocate their economic activities to
the next period. Later, the reform stimulates the economy. Based on this find-
ing, Cardi and Restout (2014) showed that, in an open economy, a switch from
labour taxes to consumption taxes leads to a greater rise in GDP if the reform
is unannounced. Our result is in line with these findings; however, in contrast,
our results are determined by increased personal savings, which function as an
externality since they reduce interest rates.
2 The model
2.1 Firms
The economy in the model is assumed to be closed. Capital and labour markets
are competitive. Production function (Yt) has a standard Cobb-Douglass form,
wages (wt) and interest rates (rt+1) being equal to the marginal returns to
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labour (Lt) and capital (Kt):
Yt = K
α
t L
1−α
t , (1)
wt = (1− α)kαt , (2)
1 + rt = αk
α−1
t . (3)
Capital depreciates in one period and kt is a capital-labour ratio.
2.2 Agents
Agents live for two periods and maximise a lifetime logarithmic utility function:
Ut = logC
y
t + (1 + ρ)
−1 logCot+1, (4)
where Cyt denotes consumption when young, C
o
t+1 - consumption when old; ρ is
a discount factor. Budget constraints are:
Cyt = wt(1− τt)− st, (5)
Cot+1 = st(1 + rt+1) + τ
e
t+1wt+1(1 + n), (6)
where st refers to savings, n - population growth, τt is a contribution to a DC
pension scheme, τet+1 denotes expected contribution to the pension scheme in
the next period. When the next period begins, the actual contribution is realised
and τet+1 is replaced by its actual realisation τt+1. We assume that τ
e
t+1 = τt if
the reform is unexpected, and τet+1 = τt+1, τt+1 < τt, when it was announced
one period before its implementation.
Plugging budget constraints into the utility function and maximising it with
respect to savings, we received
st =
wt(1− τt)
2 + ρ
− wt+1(1 + ρ)(1 + n)
(2 + ρ)(1 + rt+1)
τet+1. (7)
Capital amount at t+1 is determined by savings at time t: kt+1 = st/(1+n).
Using this equality and equations (2-3), savings can be expressed as
st =
α(1− α)kαt (1− τt)
τet+1(1− α)(1 + ρ) + α(2 + ρ)
. (8)
3 Optimality
In this section we consider the lifetime utility of the older generation alive at
the time of pension reform. Insert (2-3) and (8) to expressions (5-6):
Cyt = (1− τt)(1− α)kαt
(
1− α
τet+1(1− α)(1 + ρ) + α(2 + ρ)
)
, (9)
Cot+1 =
(
α(1− α)kαt (1− τt)
τet+1(1− α)(1 + ρ) + α(2 + ρ)
)α
(1 + n)1−α[α+ τt+1(1− α)]. (10)
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Figure 1: Equivalent variation
Plugging these expressions into the utility function, it is possible to maximise
it with respect to τet+1. Note that other variables at time t are constant.
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The maximum is achieved when τet+1 = 1. If τ
e
t+1 < 1 the utility’s derivative
with respect to τet+1 is positive, i.e. agents get a higher lifetime utility if they
overestimate their pension benefits. Given this result, τt+1 < τt implies that
elderly agents at the time of the reform get a higher utility if the reform was
unannounced.
It should be stressed that the optimality condition is received only for the
first transitional generation, which suffers the most from the pension reform.
The maximisation problem for other generations would have to take capital
accumulation into account.
4 Transitional dynamics
In this numerical example we present short-run welfare effects. Parameter values
are usually used in the literature: α = 0.4, ρ corresponds to a 1% annual
discount rate, keeping in mind that one period lasts for 35 years, n = 0, τt = 0.2
for t ≤ 0 and τt = 0.15 if t ≥ 1; therefore, tax reform takes place at t = 1.
Figure 1 presents welfare effects for generations in terms of equivalent varia-
tion. It can be seen that if the reform is announced, a generation born at t = 0
has higher welfare losses than if the pension reform were unannounced. But, if
2This an easy task, because omitting irrelevant constants, utility maximisation is equivalent
to the maximisation of logX+α(1+ρ)−1 log (1−X), with respect toX, whereX = α[τet+1(1−
α)(1 + ρ) + α(2 + ρ)]−1.
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the reform is expected, the gains of the transitional generations born at t ≥ 1
are higher. Indeed, in this case, agents born at t = 0 increase their savings,
leading to a greater amount of capital at t = 1; higher capital-labour ratio at
t = 1, in turn, leads to higher wages, and, consequently, increased savings in
the generation born at t = 1. However, generations born at t ≥ 1 are better off
independent of whether the reform is announced or not.
5 Robustness
As a robustness check, we made numerical simulations assuming a CES produc-
tion function. Welfare effects with all the parameters we tried were very similar
if the model was dynamically efficient and an internal equilibrium existed. How-
ever, for low elasticities of substitution there was no internal equilibrium.
Some differences may be noted if the logarithmic utility function is replaced
by the CES form. For reasonable parameter values the conclusion remains the
same; but if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is very low (≤ 0.04 with
other parameter values unchanged from our numerical example), the result no
longer holds. Indeed, if consumptions in different periods are almost perfect
complements and the reform is unannounced, the first transitional generation’s
decline in consumption when old is not compensated by higher consumption
when young (compared with the announced reform).
The finding of the paper also depends on specific model assumptions. The
economy is assumed to be closed, but in the case of a small open economy,
pension reform and its announcement do not change interest rates; as a result,
the effect discussed in this paper no longer holds. However, if the economy is
open and (relatively) large, the results still hold, while losses and benefits of
this reform spillover to the neighboring countries. This result can be seen in an
earlier draft of this paper (Fedotenkov 2012, chapter 6).
Moreover, the effect presented in the paper depends on the assumption that
there is no habit formation as in the Campbell-Cochrane model (Campbell and
Cochrane 1999). It is very likely that the inclusion of habit formation in the
model could significantly change the results. Another assumption, which may
affect our results, is the absence of static inefficiencies. If pension reform reduces
static inefficiencies, the government may issue debt to compensate losses of the
older generation, and pay out this debt by taxing benefits of the younger and
future generations (See Homburg (1990), for example). In our case, expectations
of such a reform would affect the size of the debt that the government would
issue.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we showed that governments may have incentives not to announce
a shift from a PAYG to a more-funded pension scheme, because agents, who
expect such a reform, reduce their consumptions at the time of announcement.
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This increases savings and reduces the interest rate, which has a negative im-
pact on agents’ welfare. However, such an announcement increases the welfare
of subsequent generations due to a higher amount of capital in the following
periods. Clearly, such a result calls into question whether an unannounced
pension reform is politically feasible. This would most likely depend on the
individual country; however, governments may consider reducing the time be-
tween announcement and implementation in order to protect agents who suffer
the most.
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